# A Web-Appendix

#### A.1 Data sources and definitions of variables

#### A.1.1 Outcome variables

- Marriage rate: Two different definitions of the marriage rate are used. In the first case, the marriage rate is defined as the absolute number of marriages per 1,000 of the population between 15 and 55 years of age. In the second case, the marriage rate is defined as the absolute number of marriages per 1,000 of non-married population. The absolute number of marriages is from the annual editions of the *Vital Statistics* and missing for 4 state-years (CA 1991; OK 2001-03).
- Divorce rate: Two different definitions of the divorce rate are used. In the first case, the divorce rate is defined as the absolute number of divorces per 1,000 of the population between 15 and 55 years of age. In the second case, the divorce rate is defined as the absolute number of divorces per 1,000 of married population. The absolute number of divorces is from the annual editions of the *Vital Statistics* and missing for 76 state-years (CA 1991-95, 1999; CO 1995-00; HI 2003; IN 1991-03; LA 1991-01; OK 2001-03).
- Age and sex-specific population data: Age and sex-specific population data is calculated from county-level data from the *Reading Survey of Epidemiology and End Results* (RSEER) provided by the *National Bureau of Economic Research* (NBER).
- Married and non-married population: These proxies are constructed based on information on the stock of married population from the decennial US Census from 1960 to 2000 and on the flow into and out of marriage from the annual editions of the Vital Statistics. The measure of the married female population is constructed as follows: For each state the number of married women is taken from the US Census 1960. Then for the years 1961 to 1969 the absolute number of marriages is added and the absolute number of divorces is subtracted. The resulting number is compared with the actual number of married women from the US Census 1970. In most of the cases the difference between the auxiliary number and the actual number of married women is positive, i.e. the deaths and out-migration of married women outweigh the in-migration of married women. In 12.7% of the cases a negative difference can be observed, which means that net in-migration of married women takes place. Then the sum of deaths and migration of married women is assumed to be constant between 1961 and 1969 and the difference over the years 1961 to 1969 is distributed equally. An equivalent procedure is applied for the 1970s to 1990s, and also to obtain a proxy for the number of married men. The non-married population is the difference between the adult population and the married population (sum of married women and men).
- Number-specific marriage rate: The marriage number-specific marriage rate is the absolute number of marriages of the respective group per 1,000 population between 15 and 55 years of age. The absolute number of marriages of each group is derived from micro-level marriage certificate data from the *National Vital Statistics System* (NVSS) of the *National*

Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) and available for the majority of the states from 1969 through 1995; see notes to Figure A.3.

- Bride's (groom's) age-specific marriage rate: The bride's (groom's) age-specific marriage rate is defined as the absolute number of marriages of brides (grooms) in the specified age-group per 1,000 female (male) population of this age-group. The absolute number of marriages of each age-group is derived from micro-level marriage certificate data from the NVSS of the NCHS and available for the majority of the states from 1969 through 1995; see notes to Figure A.3.
- Marriage number-specific divorce rate: The marriage number-specific divorce rate is the absolute number of divorces of the respective group per 1,000 population between 15 and 55 years of age. The absolute number of divorces of each group is derived from microlevel divorce certificate data from the NVSS of the NCHS and available for the majority of the states from 1969 through 1995; see notes to Figure A.4.
- Wife's (husband's) age-specific divorce rate: The wife's (husband's) age-specific divorce rate is defined as the absolute number of divorces of females (males) in the specified age-group per 1,000 female (male) population of this age-group. The absolute number of divorces of each age-group is derived from micro-level divorce certificate data from the NVSS of the NCHS and available for the majority of the states from 1969 through 1995; see notes to Figure A.4.
- Age-specific fertility rate: The age-specific fertility rate is the absolute number of births to all mothers from a certain age-group per 1,000 female population of this age-group. The absolute number of births of each age-group is derived from micro-level birth certificate data from the NVSS of the NCHS.
- Age-specific marital (non-marital) fertility rate: The age-specific marital (non-marital) fertility rate is the absolute number of births to all married (unmarried) mothers from a certain age-group per 1,000 female population of this age-group. The absolute number of births of each group is derived from micro-level birth certificate data from the NVSS of the NCHS and available for the majority of the states from 1969 through 2002; see notes to Figure A.5.
- Age-specific legitimacy ratio: The age-specific legitimacy ratio is defined as the number of marital births divided by all births to mothers from a certain age-group multiplied by 100.
- **Abortion**: Information on the absolute number of abortions per state (of occurrence) and year is from the website of the *Guttmacher Institute* and available for all states from 1973-82, 1984-85, 1987-88, 1991-92, 1995-96, and 1999-2000. Note, information for LA and ND is missing in 1973.
- Labor force participation: Labor force participation is captured on an individual level with data from the *March Current Population Survey* (CPS) covering the period from 1969

through 2003. In particular, I use data provided by King et al. (2010).<sup>1</sup> I consider all states (except Nevada), however, 272 state-years are missing, since 31 states are grouped together between 1969 and 1972, and 37 are grouped together between 1973 and 1976. In particular, the following states are missing for the period in brackets: AK, AL, AR, AZ, CO, DE, HI, IA, ID, KS, ME, MI, MN, MS, MT, ND, NE, NH, NM, OK, RI, SC, SD, UT, VA, VT, WA, WI, WY (from 1969 through 1976); MA, NC (from 1969 through 1972); and GA, KY, LA, MD, MO, OR, TN, WV (from 1973 through 1976).

• Sex-specific suicide rates: The sex-specific suicide rates are defined as the number of female (male) suicides per million females (males). Data until 1996 is from Stevenson and Wolfers (2006). Data after 1996 have been downloaded from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics. Compressed Mortality File 1999-2007. CDC WONDER On-line Database, compiled from the Compressed Mortality File 1999-2007 Series 20 No. 2M, 2010. (Accessed at http://wonder.cdc.gov/cmf-icd10.html on January 16, 2011.)


#### A.1.2 Control variables

- Unilateral divorce law  $(UD_{s,t}^r)$ : Under mutual consent law both spouses need to agree to divorce. Unilateral divorce law allows either party to file for divorce without the consent of the other. The coding follows Wolfers (2006); see Table 1.
- Prevailing law for to the division of matrimonial property in divorce  $(EP_{s,t})$ : I distinguish between common property regimes (base group) and equitable property regimes. In the former regime, spouses were generally only entitled to assets they themselves brought into marriage, while in the latter, property was generally divided more equally. The coding follows Rasul (2003).
- Age-at-marriage laws: I control for the ages at which men and women could marry with and without their parents' consent (i.e. four control variables are included). Information for all states is taken from Blank et al. (2009). Since no information on Washington, D.C. is available, I exclude it from the analysis.
- Abortion laws: In 1970, five states (Alaska, California, Hawaii, New York and Washington) legalized abortion. Following an US Supreme Court decision in 1973, abortion became also legal in all remaining states (Donohue and Levitt, 2001).
- Sex ratio: This variable is defined as the ratio of female adults to males adults. This variable is calculated from county-level data from the RSEER provided by the NBER.
- Sex-race-age-distribution: I control for the share of the total population of sex g, of race h, and in age-group i where h is white, black and other, and i is 0-14, 15-19, ..., 60-64 and 65+ (12 groups). These variables are calculated from county-level data from the RSEER provided by the NBER.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>King, Miriam, Steven Ruggles, Trent Alexander, Sarah Flood, Katie Genadek, Matthew B. Schroeder, Brandon Trampe and Rebecca Vick (2010), 'Integrated public use microdata series, current population survey: Version 3.0. [machine-readable database]', University of Minnesota.


# A.2 Additional tables and figures

Figure A.1: Year of enactment of joint custody laws across the  $US^a$ 



 $<sup>^{</sup>a}$  Note, the introduction of joint custody did not follow any systematic geographical patterns.

Figure A.2: Share of treated population and number of treated states a



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Note, the share of treated population and the number of treated states evolve uniformly over time. That means, no particularly small nor particularly large states have been early or late adopters.


Table A.1: Trends in joint physical custody awards<sup>a</sup>

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
$\mathrm{AK}^b$		20.7	20.8	19.6	23.5	27.1	27.4
$\mathrm{CT}^c$	35.5	36.7	39.5	41.6	46.3	41.2	47.1
$\mathrm{IA}^c$			22.2	15.2	13.5	12.4	12.4
$\mathrm{ID}^c$	33.5	34.3	33.7	33.7	29.2	26.0	25.2
$\mathrm{IL}^c$	13.8	14.8	16.3	19.2	20.8	22.5	22.3
$KS^c$	41.1	45.3	51.0	54.9	48.6	53.3	56.3
$\mathrm{MD}^c$							23.5
$\mathrm{MI}^c$	13.0	14.5	13.4	13.2	12.8	14.4	14.1
$MO^c$	14.6	16.0	17.2	17.5	17.2	15.0	15.2
$\mathrm{MT}^b$	45.2	45.8	52.7	53.8	53.2	55.5	57.3
$NE^c$		4.6	4.9	4.9	5.8	7.0	11.0
$\mathrm{NH}^b$	7.0	7.3	8.6	9.4	10.7	11.2	13.6
$OR^c$	15.0	15.3	19.1	19.6	20.9	21.5	23.5
$PA^c$	11.0	11.4	12.8	14.2	14.9	16.7	16.6
$\mathrm{RI}^b$				30.1	17.4	28.2	25.5
$SD^b$			29.5	29.7	23.6	17.7	15.4
$\mathrm{TN}^c$	8.7	9.0	10.5	13.7	12.8	12.0	14.1
$\mathrm{UT}^c$	9.8	8.8	11.2	8.6	12.8	14.4	18.2
$VA^c$		15.2	13.8	14.5	17.2	17.7	20.9
$VT^b$				12.8	13.6	19.5	21.5
$\mathrm{WI}^c$	35.8		46.0	45.7	50.4	49.1	50.4
$WY^b$					16.8	18.4	21.8


 $<sup>^</sup>a$  This table shows the share of joint physical custody awards derived from micro-level divorce certificate data from the NVSS of the NCHS using 179, 997 divorces from all state-years in the so-called divorce-registration area from 1989 through 1995. These figures are based on all observations for which either sole or joint physical custody is awarded for all children. The definition of joint physical custody is a minimum of 30% time share with each parent.  $^b$  Figures are based on a full sample of all divorcing couples.  $^c$  Figures are based on a random sample of all divorces. For details refer to National Center for Health Statistics (1997).

Figure A.3: The development of group-specific marriage rates<sup>a</sup>


## Number-specific marriage rates



#### Bride's age-specfic marriage rates




## Groom's age-specfic marriage rates




<sup>a</sup> These graphs summarize the development of average-group-specific marriage rates based on annual US state-level data (excluding Nevada) from 1969 through 1995. The collection of detailed information on marrying couples was suspended beginning in January 1996. According to the NCHS limitations in the information collected by the states as well as budgetary considerations necessitated this action (see Federal Register Notice, December 15, 1995). Note, the following state-years are missing: AR 1969, 1971-95; AZ 1969-1995; CO 1969, 1971-78; ME 1995; MN 1969; ND 1969, 1971-79, 1981-95; NM 1969-1995; OK 1969-1995; SC 1969; TX 1969, 1971-79, 1981-95; WA 1969, 1971-79, 1981-95. The marriage number-specific marriage rate is the absolute number of marriages of the respective group per 1,000 population between 15 and 55 years of age. The bride's (groom's) age-specific marriage rate is defined as the absolute number of marriages of brides (grooms) in the specified age-group per 1,000 female (male) population of this age-group. The absolute number of marriages of each group is derived from micro-level marriage certificate data from the NVSS of the NCHS. Age and sex-specific population data is calculated from county-level data from the RSEER.

Figure A.4: The development of group-specific divorce rates<sup>a</sup>


## Number-specific divorce rates



#### Wife's age-specfic divorce rates




## Husband's age-specfic divorce rates



<sup>a</sup> These graphs summarize the development of average-group-specific divorce rates based on annual US state-level data (excluding Nevada) from 1969 through 1995. The collection of detailed information on divorcing couples was suspended beginning in January 1996. According to the NCHS limitations in the information collected by the states as well as budgetary considerations necessitated this action (see Federal Register Notice, December 15, 1995). Note, the following state-years are missing: AR 1969-95; AZ 1969-95; CA 1978-95; CO 1969-95; DE 1969-80; FL 1969-95; IN 1969-95; MA 1969-95; ME 1969-95; MN 1969-95; MN 1969-95; MS 1969-95; ND 1969-95; NH 1969-95; NH 1969-95; NM 1969-95; OK 1969-95; SC 1969-70; TX 1969-95; WA 1969-95; WV 1969-95. The marriage number-specific divorce rate is the absolute number of divorces of the respective group per 1,000 population between 15 and 55 years of age. The wife's (husband's) age-specific divorce rate is defined as the absolute number of divorces of females (males) in the specified age-group per 1,000 female (male) population of this age-group. The absolute number of divorces of each group is derived from micro-level divorce certificate data from the NVSS of the NCHS. Age and sex-specific population data is calculated from county-level data from the RSEER.

Figure A.5: The development of age-specific fertility rates<sup>a</sup>



<sup>a</sup> These graphs summarize the development of average age-specific fertility rates based on annual US state-level data (excluding Nevada) from 1969 through 2002. Note, the following state-years are missing in the two lower panels, since not all authorities recorded information on the mothers marital status: CA 1969-79; CT 1969-79; GA 1969-79; ID 1969-77; MA 1969-77; MD 1969-79; MI 1978-79; MT 1969-79; NY 1969-79; OH 1969-79; TX 1977-79; VT 1969-77. The age-specific (marital, non-marital) fertility rate is defined as the absolute number of births to all (married, unmarried) mothers from a certain age-group per 1,000 female population of this age-group. The absolute number of births of each group is derived from micro-level birth certificate data from the NVSS of the NCHS. Age and sex-specific population data is calculated from county-level data from the RSEER.

Figure A.6: Number of states on which the identification of effects is based 36 39 30 42 9 45 30 45 9 46 46 30 9 46 ೫ 50 1 47 40 10 20 -3 Number of states

9,01,51 --- Joint custody law --- Unilateral divorce law Years since reform 80/ OOL A OF CO ج<sup>مار</sup> 0,1001

Table A.2: The effect of the adoption of jc on marriage and divorce rates – comparing specification III with and without leads<sup>a</sup>

$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$			Marris	Marriage rate			Divor	Divorce rate	
in effect since for $\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		II-II)	I)	+ III-M)	leads)	III-U)	(	(D-III +	leads)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Joint custody in effect since/fc	ır							
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	=> minus 9			-1.3%	(3.5)			~9.0-	(4.9)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	minus 8 to 7			-2.4%	(3.0)			-1.8%	(4.0)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	minus 6 to 5			-1.4%	(2.3)			-1.5%	(3.0)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	minus 4 to 3			-1.4%	(1.8)			-0.4%	(2.2)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	minus 2 to 1			-0.7%	(1.0)			-0.1%	(1.2)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 0	0.8%	(0.0)			0.2%	(1.2)		
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 1-2	2.3%	(1.7)	1.6%	(1.4)	2.9%*	(1.7)	2.9%	(1.8)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 3-4	3.8%*	(2.2)	3.4%*	(2.0)	2.5%	(2.2)	2.8%	(2.8)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 5-6	7.1%**	(2.9)	**%6.9	(2.9)	4.6%	(3.5)	5.2%	(4.5)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 7-8	9.5%	(3.6)	9.5%	(3.7)	4.2%	(4.0)	5.0%	(5.0)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 9-10	9.5%	(4.6)	8.7%*	(4.8)	1.3%	(5.5)	2.3%	(7.0)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 11-12	10.4%**	(5.0)	10.7%*	(5.5)	-1.0%	(8.3)	0.3%	(10.9)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 13-14	11.7%*	(5.8)	12.2%*	(6.4)	6.2%	(5.7)	7.7%	(10.2)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 15-16	12.6%**	(5.9)	13.3%*	(8.9)	9.1%	(7.9)	10.7%	(10.6)
lin effect for 3.2%*** (1.1) $3.4\%***$ (1.1) $7.9\%**$ (3.3) $8.0\%**$ $4.7\%***$ (1.1) $3.4\%***$ (1.7) $11.3\%***$ (2.3) $11.7\%***$ (2.3) $11.7\%***$ (2.3) $11.3\%***$ (2.3) $11.7\%***$ (2.3) $11.13\%***$ (2.3) $11.13\%***$ (2.3) $11.13\%***$ (2.3) $11.13\%***$ (2.3) $11.13\%***$ (2.3) $11.13\%***$ (2.3) $11.13\%***$ (2.3) $11.13\%***$ (3.0) $11.13\%***$ (4.1) $11.13\%***$ (4.1) $11.13\%***$ (4.1) $11.13\%***$ (4.2) $11.13\%***$ (4.3) $11.13\%***$ (4.4) $11.13\%***$ (5.0) $11.13\%***$ (6.2) $11.13\%***$ (6.1) $11.13\%***$ (6.2) $11.13\%***$ (1.8) $11.13\%***$ (1.8) $11.13\%***$ (1.8) $11.13\%**$ (1.8) $1$	years 17+	14.3%**	(7.1)	15.1%*	(7.7)	11.0%	(8.4)	12.7%	(11.0)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	_								
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 0	3.2%***	(1.1)	3.4%***	(1.1)	7.9%**	(3.3)	8.0%	(3.4)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 1-2	4.7%***	(1.6)	5.1%***	(1.7)	11.3%***	(2.3)	11.7%***	(2.1)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 3-4	5.5%	(2.2)	5.7%**	(2.3)	12.1%***	(3.0)	12.6%***	(2.8)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 5-6	5.2%	(3.2)	5.7%*	(3.2)	15.2%***	(4.1)	15.6%***	(4.1)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 7-8	8%	(4.0)	7.1%*	(4.1)	15.9%***	(4.2)	16.4%**	(4.1)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 9-10	9.1%**	(4.2)	8.6%	(4.4)	14.8%***	(5.0)	15.4%**	(4.9)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 11-12	8.6%	(4.3)	10.2%**	(4.5)	13.2%**	(5.3)	13.9%***	(5.1)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 13-14	9.3%*	(4.7)	8.9%	(4.8)	13.8%**	(5.8)	14.6%**	(5.6)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 15-16	8.2%	(4.9)	8.9%*	(4.9)	14.9%**	(6.2)	15.8%***	(5.7)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 17+	9.3%*	(5.0)	10.2%**	(5.0)	18.7%***	(6.1)	19.7%***	(5.8)
ables         See Table 3         See Table 3           1,711         1,711         1,675           variable         18 marriages per 1,000 adults         9 divorces per 1,000 ad	Equal property division	-1.7%**	(0.8)	-1.7%**	(0.8)	-0.1%	(1.8)	0.1%	(1.7)
1,711       1,675         variable       18 marriages per 1,000 adults       9 divorces per 1,000 ac	Further control variables		See T	able 3			See J	Pable 3	
18 marriages per 1,000 adults	No. of observations	1,71	_	1,71	1	1,675		1,67	2
` •	Mean of dependent variable	18 ma	rriages p	er 1,000 adu	lts	ib 6	vorces pe	er 1,000 adults	


 $^{a}$  This table compares estimation results from specifications M-III and D-III presented in Table 3, with equivalent specifications, which include in addition control for leads starting at year minus 9 (or less).

Table A.3: Detailed estimation output of results summarized in Figure  $3^a$ 

	7		200	Jano				0				
Group-specific marriage rates:	Mar	riage numb	Marriage number-specific rates	rates	Br	Bride's age-specific rates	pecific rat	es	Gre	Groom's age-specific rates	specific ra	tes
	Both first	Both $nf^b$	Bride $nf^b$	$Groom nf^b$	20 to 24	25 to 34	35 to 44	45 to 55	20 to 24	25 to 34	35 to 44	45 to 55
Static model:												
Joint custody	0.036 (0.027)	0.005	0.001 $(0.023)$	0.032 $(0.021)$	0.007	0.006 (0.014)	0.001 $(0.014)$	0.004 (0.019)	0.007	0.003	0.002 (0.013)	0.005
Unilateral divorce	-0.002 $(0.024)$	0.038	$0.058** \\ (0.023)$	0.073*** $(0.020)$	-0.005 (0.015)	0.029** $(0.014)$	0.007	0.007	-0.015 (0.016)	0.025* $(0.012)$	0.006 $(0.018)$	0.011 $(0.027)$
Equal property	-0.029** $(0.013)$	(0.020)	-0.029 $(0.017)$	-0.021 $(0.015)$	-0.007) (0.007)	-0.005 $(0.010)$	(0.003)	-0.016 $(0.016)$	-0.004 (0.008)	(0.001)	0.009	-0.011 $(0.015)$
Dynamic model:												
Joint custody in effect for												
year 0	-0.030	0.004	0.008	-0.033*	-0.004	0.005	0.020	0.004	-0.000	-0.003	0.003	0.016
years 1-2	(0.021) $-0.023$	0.016	0.020	(0.020) $-0.019$	0.003	0.011	0.019	0.023	-0.001	0.003	0.014	0.014
veare 3_4	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.024)
years of	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.038)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.029)
years 5-6	0.010	0.076*	0.076**	0.022	$0.033^{*}$	0.059**	0.075**	0.116**	0.030	0.034	0.089***	0.103***
7-8 7-8 7-8 7-8 7-8 7-8 7-8 7-8 7-8 7-8	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.031) 0.037	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.053)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.038)
y carrs	(0.040)	(0.055)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.025)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.067)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.055)
years 9-10	0.018	0.101	0.111**	0.025	$0.051^{'}$	$0.067^{'}$	0.122**	$0.163^{*}$	0.049	0.035	0.134***	$0.136^{*}$
	(0.047)	(0.071)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.032)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.086)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.068)
years 11+	0.039	0.106	0.108*	0.007	0.046	0.065	0.134**	0.155	0.056	0.029	0.138**	0.134
	(200.0)	(6.0.0)	(100.0)	(0.000)	(0.040)	(000.0)	(0.000)	(0.102)	(1.0.0)	(0.040)	(000.0)	(100.0)
Unilateral divorce law in effect for	0	0	1	<del>)</del>	0	0	0	1 7	0	1 7	0	0
year 0	0.008	0.031	0.037**	0.057**	0.005	0.019	-0.013	0.017	-0.004	0.017	0.008	0.002
years 1-2	(0.018) -0.017	0.028	$(0.018) \\ 0.027$	0.075***	0.003	0.029	$(0.025) \\ 0.011$	0.029	(0.010) -0.023	0.027	(0.023) $0.024$	(0.028) $0.034$
ò	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.038)
years 3-4	0.023	0.078	0.034	0.107***	0.025	0.027	0.009	0.007	-0.019	0.034	0.037	0.012
years 5-6	0.029	0.030)	(0.044) -0.004	(0.030) $0.094**$	(0.028) $0.026$	(0.053) $0.022$	(0.047) -0.021	(0.049) $0.018$	(0.024) -0.014	0.030	0.033	0.006
>	(0.053)	(0.062)	(0.054)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.055)	(0.053)
years 7-8	-0.007	0.060	-0.056	0.049	0.031	-0.001	-0.055	0.007	-0.021	0.014	0.020	-0.004
!	(0.045)	(0.070)	(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.065)	(0.082)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.065)	(0.065)
years 9-10	-0.012	0.062	-0.086	0.040	0.032	-0.001	-0.058	0.036	-0.019	0.009	0.025	0.018
11 arear	(0.053)	(0.082)	(0.065)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.055) -0.015	(0.074)	(0.093)	(0.047)	(0.040)	(0.076)	(0.073)
) (Care 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1	(0.060)	(0.095)	(0.070)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.063)	(0.082)	(0.105)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.087)	(0.085)
Equal property division	-0.027**	-0.008	-0.034**	-0.021	-0.008	-0.005	-0.008	-0.027*	-0.006	-0.011	0.003	-0.015
	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Number of observations Mean of dependent variable	$1,130 \\ 9.73$	1,130 $4.03$	1,130 $1.76$	1,130 $1.79$	$1,130 \\ 80.62$	1,130 $34.91$	1,130 $15.03$	1,130 $7.87$	1,130 $80.31$	1,130 $43.74$	1,130 $18.81$	1,130 $10.79$
								,				

<sup>a</sup> This table provides full estimation output of estimation results summarized in Figure 3. Note, coefficients multiplied by 100 give the percent change in the respective group-specific marriage rate due to the adoption of the respective law (the stated number of years ago). Robust standard errors (allowing for clustering by state and heteroskedasticity of unknown form) in parentheses below. \*, \*\* and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively. For further information see notes to Figure 3. <sup>b</sup> Nf stands for non-first.

Figure A.7: The effect of the adoption of joint custody on group-specific divorce rates (percent change) $^a$ 



<sup>a</sup> These graphs summarize estimation results of the effect of joint custody on group-specific divorce rates based on annual US state-level data (excluding Nevada) from 1969 through 1995. Several state-years are missing; see notes to Figure A.4. The dependent variables are marriage number-specific divorce rates, and spouses' age-specific divorce rates, respectively. Each estimation includes as control variables, state and year fixed-effects, state-specific linear and quadratic time trends, the introduction of unilateral divorce law (with lags up to 11 years after the reform), the prevalence of equal property division in case of divorce, the minimum legal ages at marriage, legalized abortion, the gross state product per capita, the adult sex ratio, and the sex-race-age-distribution of each state. Further details on all variables are provided in Section A.1. Estimated using state population weights (equal to the denominator of the respective dependent variable). Estimated effects are the percent change in the respective group-specific divorce rate due to the adoption of the respective law (the stated number of years ago). Full estimation output is available in Table A.4.

Years since joint custody reform

Table A.4: Detailed estimation output of results summarized in Figure A.7a


					•			)   				
Group-specific divorce rates:	Ma	Marriage number-specific rates	er-specifi	c rates	A	ife's age-s	Wife's age-specific rates	es	Hus	Husband's age-specific rates	e-specific	ates
	H. first	H. further	W. first	W. further	20 to 24	25 to 34	35 to 44	45 to 55	20  to  24	25 to 34	35 to 44	45 to 55
Static model:												
Joint custody	0.002	-0.002	-0.001	0.007	0.014	-0.001	-0.008	0.002	0.020	-0.007	0.004	-0.004
Unilateral divorce	0.059	0.050		0.062	0.014	-0.008	-0.020	0.027	0.027	-0.005	-0.032	0.008
Equal property	(0.073) $-0.018$ $(0.031)$	(0.070) $-0.020$ $(0.032)$	(0.061) $-0.039*$ $(0.021)$	(0.069) $-0.033*$ $(0.018)$	$\begin{pmatrix} 0.082 \\ 0.012 \\ (0.027) \end{pmatrix}$	(0.071) $0.005$ $(0.030)$	(0.068) $0.003$ $(0.029)$	(0.071) $-0.020$ $(0.024)$	$(0.084) \\ 0.001 \\ (0.026)$	$(0.078) \\ 0.010 \\ (0.031)$	$(0.067) \\ 0.014 \\ (0.028)$	(0.066) $-0.023$ $(0.029)$
Dynamic model:						,	,					
Joint custody in effect for												
year 0	-0.012	-0.014		0.001	-0.004	-0.022*	-0.020	-0.002	0.001	-0.026*	-0.016	-0.008
years 1-2	$(0.026) \\ 0.009$	(0.027) $0.006$	$(0.014) \\ 0.008$	$(0.013) \\ 0.015$	$(0.020) \\ 0.024$	$(0.012) \\ 0.007$	$(0.015) \\ 0.016$	(0.017) $-0.014$	$(0.021) \\ 0.028$	$(0.014) \\ 0.002$	$(0.018) \\ 0.023$	$(0.014) \\ 0.004$
C	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.023)
years 3-4	(0.034)	(0.034)		0.021 $(0.025)$	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.025)	(0.023)	0.025
years 5-6	0.026	0.032		0.021	0.042	0.025	0.062**	-0.003	0.033	0.029	0.057*	0.047
(	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.042)
years 7-8	0.013	0.020	0.027	0.015	0.032	-0.001	0.063*	-0.003	0.028	0.003	0.058	0.026
years 9-10	0.007	0.017	0.036	-0.003	0.023	-0.010	0.056	-0.026	0.010	-0.007	0.057	0.022
	(0.053)	(0.053)		(0.044)	(0.080)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.074)	(0.093)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.062)
years 11+	0.002	0.019		-0.025	0.019	-0.008	0.073	-0.064	-0.006	-0.002	0.051	0.035
	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.086)	(0.050)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.100)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.078)
Unilateral divorce law in effect for	1	0		1	6	0	(	0	0		0	0
year 0	0.072	0.064	0.061	0.079	0.035	0.032	0.016	0.048	0.040	0.034	0.010	0.035
vears 1-2	(0.019) 0.034	0.029		-0.001	-0.001	-0.011	-0.027	0.035	0.03	-0.026	-0.032	0.031
,	(0.065)	(0.060)		(0.056)	(0.076)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.083)	(0.065)	(0.060)	(0.061)
years 3-4	0.030	0.023	0.008	0.020	0.037	0.044	0.014	0.050	0.047	0.017	0.031	0.070
9 19 11 11	(0.074)	(0.064)	(0.041)	(0.056)	(0.075)	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.075)	(0.081)	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.072)
years 5-0	0.041	(0.080)		(0.050)	(0.102)	(690.0)	0.030	(0.077)	0.013	0.022	(0.037	0.094 $(0.085)$
years 7-8	0.074	0.077		0.026	0.095	0.109	0.060	0.118	0.095	0.086	0.086	0.127
	(0.095)	(0.082)		(0.064)	(0.114)	(0.066)	(0.088)	(0.081)	(0.124)	(0.075)	(0.085)	(0.083)
years 9-10	0.086	0.086	-0.027	-0.006	0.056	0.119	0.080	0.178*	0.057	0.082	0.115	0.149
	(0.119)	(0.104)	(0.063)	(0.079)	(0.115)	(0.071)	(0.082)	(0.094)	(0.128)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.099)
years 11+	0.055 $(0.128)$	0.045	-0.063	-0.018 (0.076)	0.032	0.080)	0.063 $(0.103)$	(0.108)	0.049 $(0.145)$	0.058	0.086	0.149 $(0.117)$
Equal property division	-0.016	-0.018	-0.036	-0.033	0.015	0.006	0.004	-0.011	0.002	0.012	0.016	-0.022
3	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Number of observations	286	982	982	982	812	812	812	812	812	812	812	812
Mean of dependent variable	5.09	5.09	2.08	2.09	21.30	20.93	14.59	7.17	12.48	21.05	17.05	10.24

<sup>a</sup> This table provides full estimation output of estimation results summarized in Figure A.7. Note, coefficients multiplied by 100 give the percent change in the respective group-specific divorce rate due to the adoption of joint custody (unilateral divorce law) the stated number of years ago. Robust standard errors (allowing for clustering by state and heteroskedasticity of unknown form) in parentheses below. \*, \*\* and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively. For further information see notes to Figure A.7.

-01 O1 O1 Figure A.8: The effect of the adoption of joint custody on age-specific fertility behavior<sup>a</sup> 67 OJ.C. -c/<sub>01/1</sub> Marital fertility rates Legitimacy ratios 01016 35 to 44 years -00/c رار ج Years since joint custody reform Ż ٦.5 15 ١0 8 0 ς. 9 Estimated percent change Estimated percentage point change 20 to 24 years Non-marital fertility rates Fertility rates (all births) 01016 -80y 10 8 -۱٥ 15 9 9١-92-Estimated percent change Estimated percent change

 $^a$  These graphs summarize estimation results presented in Table 4.

Figure A.9: The effect of the adoption of joint custody on age-specific non-marital fertility rates and the legitimacy ratio with leads<sup>a</sup>



<sup>a</sup> These graphs summarize estimation results of the effect of joint custody on age-specific non-marital fertility rates and the legitimacy ratio based on annual US state-level data (excluding Nevada) from 1969 through 2002. Each specification (in each panel) is equivalent to that presented in Table 4, however, also controls for leads starting at year minus 9 (or less). Estimated effects are the percent change in the respective non-marital fertility rate (and the percentage point change in the legitimacy ratio) due to the adoption of joint custody the stated number of years ago.


Table A.5: The effect of the adoption of joint custody on the incidence of abortion<sup>a</sup>

			Abortion rate (percent change)	n rate hange)				d)	Abortion ratio (percentage points change)	Abortion ratio entage points chan	ge)	
	(AR-I)	(1	(AR-II)	()	(AR-III)	(11)	(AO-I)	(I-	(AO-II)	(II)	(AC	(AO-III)
Static model:												
Joint custody	-3.2%	(3.0)	1.3%	(2.5)	2.7%	(3.1)	-11.8	(8.5)	-2.0	(8.1)	4.7	(9.8)
Unilateral divorce	19.2%***	(6.7)	22.5% ***	(5.6)	16.5%***	(5.2)	65.0**	(24.6)	70.6***	(22.0)	51.8*	(21.3)
Equal property division  Dynamic model:	0.470	(4.0)	4.0/0	(3.5)	7:170	(6.6)	0.7	(12.0)	10.1	(10.9)	 	(0.11)
Joint custody in effect for	į	(	3	(	Š	(	1	(	I	(	(	1
year 0	-0.5%	(2.9)	1.3%	(2.8)	2.0%	(3.2)	-2.5	(8.8)	0.7	(9.2)	2.2	(10.1)
years 1-2	-3.6%	(3.7)	~6.0-	(3.1)	3.0%	(3.8)	-15.3	(11.5)	-9.7	(10.2)	2.9	(12.2)
years 3-4	-1.9%	(4.2)	-1.4%	(3.9)	4.3%	(4.6)	-10.5	(12.3)	-9.2	(12.4)	8.6	(14.1)
years 5-6	-4.2%	(4.7)	-5.5%	(4.5)	3.5%	(5.5)	-18.3	(13.8)	-21.7	(15.0)	4.1	(17.1)
years 7-8	-0.4%	(5.3)	-5.4%	(5.5)	5.0%	(6.9)	9.9-	(15.5)	-19.6	(17.8)	9.3	(21.3)
years 9-10	-2.4%	(5.8)	-8.2%	(5.9)	4.0%	(2.6)	-16.0	(16.6)	-30.1	(20.2)	0.0	(25.3)
years 11-12	1.9%	(6.1)	-9.4%	(6.4)	1.7%	(9.2)	-3.5	(16.3)	-32.2	(22.2)	-7.6	(29.6)
years 13-14	-2.4%	(6.1)	-14.7%**	(7.3)	-2.0%	(11.2)	-14.5	(16.5)	-45.9*	(24.6)	-17.0	(36.3)
years $15+$	-2.3%	(7.5)	-17.7%**	(8.4)	-3.6%	(12.8)	-16.7	(21.2)	-53.4*	(28.1)	-16.7	(40.4)
Unilateral divorce in effect for												
year 0	17.9%**	(6.9)	21.3%***	(5.4)	16.0%***	(5.1)	61.3**	(25.1)	64.7***	(21.5)	50.8**	(19.0)
years 1-2	20.9%***	(5.6)	25.3%***	(7.1)	14.4%**	(6.9)	82.0**	(26.8)	73.7***	(26.1)	42.3*	(23.2)
years 3-4	19.9%**	(7.5)	26.1%***	(2.8)	8.8%	(8.1)	64.8**	(26.3)	72.1**	(27.5)	29.0	(26.3)
years 5-6	24.4%***	(8.5)	30.2%***	(8.6)	10.3%	(9.7)	8.69	(27.3)	75.1***	(28.0)	26.6	(29.7)
years 7-8	24.9%***	(8.7)	30.7%	(0.6)	10.6%	(10.8)	67.3**	(26.3)	72.0**	(27.8)	27.4	(32.1)
years 9-10	23.7%***	(8.7)	28.9%***	(9.1)	7.8%	(11.4)	59.8*	(28.0)	62.3**	(29.0)	20.2	(34.7)
years 11-12	23.3%**	(9.6)	29.6%***	(10.2)	8.3%	(11.3)	52.9	(32.8)	59.7*	(33.9)	19.2	(34.2)
years 13-14	29.2%***	(0.6)	37.1%***	(10.4)	13.5%	(11.8)	71.5**	(31.0)	81.2**	(34.7)	38.2	(36.8)
years $15+$	27.5%***	(8.8)	37.5%***	(11.3)	12.6%	(12.5)	89.7	(29.8)	**8.08	(38.7)	36.0	(39.1)
Equal property division	0.8%	(4.0)	5.1%	(3.2)	1.6%	(03.2)	5.0	(12.8)	16.1	(11.0)	9.9	(10.7)
Control variables:												
State-specific flue trends State-specific quadratic time trends	ou		yes		yes		on on	0 0	yes	<b>10</b>	r r	yes yes
Mean of dependent variable	18	3 abortion	18 abortions per 1,000 females aged 15 to 44	emales ag	ed 15 to 44			304 ab	304 abortions per 1,000 live births	1,000 live	births	

<sup>a</sup> This table summarizes estimation results based on annual US state-level data (excluding Nevada) from 1973 through 2000; where the following years are missing for all included states 1983, 1986, 1989-90, 1993-94, 1997-98, and 1973 is missing for LA and ND. The number of observations is 978. In columns AR-I to AR-III the dependent variable is the abortion births). The absolute number of abortions (by state of occurrence) is from the website of the Guttmacher Institute. The absolute number of females between 15 and 44 years of age is calculated from county-level data from the RSEER. The number of live-births is derived from individual-level birth certificate data from the NVSS of the NCHS. Estimated using state rate (absolute number of abortions per 1,000 females between 15 and 44 years of age) and in columns AO-I to AO-III the abortion ratio (absolute number of abortions per 1,000 live weights (females between 15 and 44 years of age, live births). Each specification (in each model) uses the same method of estimation, and includes the same set of control variables as the respective specification in Table 3. Listed coefficients are reported as the percent change in the abortion rate (and as the percentage point change in the abortion ratio) due to the adoption of the respective law (the stated number of years ago). Robust standard errors (allowing for clustering by state and heteroskedasticity of unknown form) in parentheses below.

\*, \*\* and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively. Figure A.10 provides a graphical summary of the dynamic model.

Figure A.10: The effect of the adoption of joint custody on the incidence of abortion with leads $^a$ 



 $<sup>^</sup>a$  These graphs summarize estimation results of the effect of joint custody on the incidence of abortion based on annual US state-level data (excluding Nevada) from 1973 through 2000; where the following years are missing for all included states 1983, 1986, 1989-90, 1993-94, 1997-98, and 1973 is missing for LA and ND. The number of observations is 978. Each specification (in each panel) is equivalent to those presented in Table A.5; some also control for leads starting at year minus 5 (or less).

Table A.6: The effect of the adoption of jc on female labor force participation controlling for children (percentage point change) $^a$ 

Static model:  Join and Holling State model:  Join and Landough Static model:  Join and casted divorce in effect for the state of the		Age	-specifi	Age-specific labor forc	رو	participation of all women	on of a	ll womer	J.	Age-st	ecific la	Age-specific labor force participation of married women	e parti	cipation	of ma	rried wo	men
c model: each other custody $0.6$ $0.7$ $0.6$ $0.7$ $0.6$ $0.1$ $0.6$ $0.7$ $0.6$ $0.7$ $0.6$ $0.7$ $0.6$ $0.7$ $0.6$ $0.7$ $0.6$ $0.7$ $0.6$ $0.7$ $0.6$ $0.7$		20 to	24	25 to ;	34	to	44			20 to	24	25 to		35 to	44	45 to	54
translety 0.6 (0.7) $0.6^{*}$ (0.4) $0.1$ (0.5) $0.7$ (0.5) $0.7$ (0.5) $1.4$ (0.9) $1.0^{*}$ (0.5) $0.6$ (0.5) $0.6$ (0.5) $0.6$ (0.5) $0.6$ (0.5) $0.6$ (0.6) $0.7$ (0.6) $0.7$ (0.6) $0.7$ (0.6) $0.7$ (0.6) $0.7$ (0.6) $0.7$ (0.6) $0.7$ (0.6) $0.7$ (0.6) $0.7$ (0.6) $0.7$ (0.6) $0.7$ (0.6) $0.7$ (0.7) $0.7$ (0.8) $0.7$ (1.7) $0.7$ (1.8) $0.7$ (1.7) $0.7$ (1.8)	Static model:																
Interpret details and the contract of the con	Joint custody Unilateral divorce	0.6	(0.7) $(1.4)$	0.6*	(0.4) $(1.1)$	-0.1	(0.5) $(1.3)$	-0.7	(0.5) $(1.2)$	1.4	(0.9) $(1.9)$	1.0**	(0.5) $(1.2)$	0.0-	(0.5) $(1.3)$	0.4	(0.5)
rante model: estationly in effect for custody in effect for the first off of the form of the first of the first of the first of the first of the form of the first of the fi	Equal property Child	-0.4 -27.8***	(0.7)	-0.3 -25.3***	(0.5)	0.0	(0.6) $(0.3)$	1.2*	(0.7) $(0.2)$	-0.1 -35.4**	(0.9)	-0.8 -27.2***	(0.6)	0.4	(0.7)	1.3*	(0.7)
custody in effect for 0.5 (0.9) -0.2 (0.5) -1.2* (0.6) -0.3 (0.7) 1.7 (1.2) 0.2 (0.7) -0.7 (0.8) 1.2 (0.9) -1.2* (0.7) 0.3 (1.3) 0.0 (0.7) 0.2 (1.3) 0.0 (0.7) 0.2 (1.3) 0.0 0.0 0.3 (1.3) 0.0 0.0 0.5 (1.3) 0.2 (1.3) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0	Dynamic model:		·		·		,		_		_						·
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Joint custody in effect for																
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 0	0.5	(0.9)	-0.2	(0.5)	-0.7	(9.0)	-0.3	(0.7)	1.7	(1.2)	0.2	(0.7)	-1.0	(0.7)	0.4	(0.7)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 1-2	-0.8	(0.0)	-0.5	(0.5)	-1.2*	(0.7)	0.2	(0.7)	6.0	(1.3)	0.0	(0.7)	-0.7	(0.8)	1.2	(0.7)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 3-4	-1.4	(1.1)	-0.7	(0.7)	-2.5**	(8.0)	-1.5	(0.9)	2.2	(1.6)	0.2	(0.9)	-2.4***	(0.9)	-0.3	(1.0)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 5-6	-1.1	(1.4)	-1.8**	(8.0)	-2.2**	(0.9)	9.0-	(1.1)	0.4	(2.0)	-0.8	(1.1)	-1.7	(1.1)	1.0	(1.2)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 7-8	-1.6	(1.7)	-2.5**	(1.0)	-4.3***	(1.2)	-0.2	(1.4)	1.6	(2.5)	-1.1	(1.3)	-3.9***	(1.5)	6.0	(1.5)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 9-10	-2.5	(2.0)	-3.3***	(1.2)	-4.5**	(1.4)	0.3	(1.7)	1.9	(3.0)	-2.1	(1.6)	-3.7**	(1.7)	8.0	(1.8)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 11-12	-3.8	(2.3)	-4.6***	(1.4)	-5.8**	(1.6)	-0.5	(1.9)	8.0	(3.5)	-3.3*	(1.8)	-5.3***	(2.0)	0.4	(2.1)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 13-14	-4.8*	(2.6)	-4.7***	(1.6)	-6.3***	(1.8)	0.2	(2.1)	0.3	(4.0)	-3.3	(2.1)	-5.2**	(2.2)	1.7	(2.3)
treral divorce in effect for $-1.3$ (1.6) $1.5$ (1.4) $-1.5$ (1.3) $0.3$ (1.2) $-1.7$ (2.0) $1.3$ (2.5) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.5) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.7) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.8) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.9) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.9) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.9) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.9) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.9) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.9) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.9) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.9) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.9) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.9) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.9) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.9) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.9) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.9) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.1) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.1) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.1) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.2) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.2) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.3) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.3) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.4) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.5) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.5) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.6) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.7) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.8) $-7.0^{***}$ (2.9) $-7.0^{****}$ (2.9) $-7.0^{****}$ (2.9) $-7.0^{*****}$ (2.9) $-7.0^{************************************$	years 15-16	-3.8	(2.9)	-5.9***	(1.8)	-7.0**	(2.0)	0.5	(2.3)	2.4	(4.5)	-4.8**	(2.3)	-6.3***	(2.4)	1.8	(2.5)
teral divorce in effect for $-1.3$ (1.6) $1.5$ (1.4) $-1.5$ (1.4) $-1.5$ (1.3) $0.3$ (1.2) $-1.7$ (2.0) $1.3$ (1.5) $-0.8$ (1.5) $-0.8$ (1.3) $0.6$ $0.4$ (1.9) $2.7^*$ (1.4) $0.7$ (1.6) $2.0$ (1.6) $3.1$ (2.5) $2.4$ (1.7) $1.0$ (1.7) $1.0$ (1.7) $1.9$ $2.1$ $3.4$ $-0.6$ (2.9) $0.4$ (1.9) $0.7$ (1.8) $0.7$ (1.6) $0.7$ (1.7) $0.7$ (1.8) $0.7$	years 17+	-6.7**	(3.4)	-7.0***	(2.0)	-7.7**	(2.2)	6.0	(2.5)	1.2	(5.4)	-7.0**	(2.5)	-7.0***	(2.7)	3.6	(2.9)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Unilateral divorce in effect 1	for															
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 0	-1.3	(1.6)	1.5	(1.4)	-1.5	(1.3)	0.3	(1.2)	-1.7	(2.0)	1.3	(1.5)	-0.8	(1.3)	9.0	(1.1)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 1-2	0.4	(1.9)	2.7*	(1.4)	0.7	(1.6)	2.0	(1.6)	3.1	(2.5)	2.4	(1.7)	1.0	(1.7)	1.9	(1.7)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 3-4	9.0-	(2.4)	8.0**	(1.9)	1.8	(1.8)	2.6	(2.0)	2.9	(3.2)	4.3*	(2.3)	3.3*	(1.9)	2.1	(2.0)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 5-6	-0.5	(2.9)	7.3***	(2.1)	3.2	(2.2)	4.1*	(2.4)	5.8 8.0	(4.0)	4.7*	(2.6)	4.6*	(2.4)	2.9	(2.5)
9-10 $2.7$ $(3.9)$ $9.0*** (2.8) 4.1 (2.9) 4.5 (3.1) 11.3** (5.3) 4.7 (3.4) 6.3* (3.2) 3.1 11-12 2.2 (4.3) 9.0*** (3.0) 3.8 (3.3) 6.7* (3.4) 12.5** (5.9) 3.5 (5.9) 3.5 (3.7) 5.2 (3.6) 5.6 13-14 2.2 (4.6) 10.3*** (3.3) 3.1 (3.5) 5.8 (3.7) 10.9* (6.4) 5.1 (4.0) 5.2 (3.8) 3.8 15-16 1.5 $	years 7-8	0.4	(3.5)	8.4**	(2.5)	3.2	(2.6)	4.2	(2.8)	8.9	(4.8)	5.0*	(3.0)	4.7*	(2.8)	3.0	(2.8)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 9-10	2.7	(3.9)	8.0***	(2.8)	4.1	(2.9)	4.5	(3.1)	11.3**	(5.3)	4.7	(3.4)	6.3*	(3.2)	3.1	(3.3)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 11-12	2.2	(4.3)	8.0***	(3.0)	3.8	(3.3)	6.7*	(3.4)	12.5**	(5.9)	3.5	(3.7)	5.2	(3.6)	5.6	(3.6)
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	years 13-14	2.2	(4.6)	10.3***	(3.3)	3.1	(3.5)	5.8	(3.7)	10.9*	(6.4)	5.1	(4.0)	5.2	(3.8)	3.8	(3.9)
$17+ \\ 17+ \\ 17+ \\ 17+ \\ 17+ \\ 17+ \\ 17+ \\ 17+ \\ 17+ \\ 17+ \\ 18+ \\ 17+ \\ 17+ \\ 17+ \\ 18+ \\ 17+ \\ 17+ \\ 18+ \\ 17+ \\ 18+ \\ 18+ \\ 17+ \\ 18+ $	years 15-16	1.5	(4.9)	10.5***	(3.5)	2.9	(3.8)	0.9	(3.9)	11.9*	(6.9)	5.0	(4.3)	5.2	(4.1)	3.7	(4.2)
property division -0.2 (0.7) 0.1 (0.5) 0.5 (0.6) $1.4^{**}$ (0.7) -0.1 (0.9) -0.5 (0.6) 0.9 (0.7) 1.5** -27.9*** (0.5) -25.3*** (0.3) -9.7*** (0.3) -3.0*** (0.2) -35.4*** (0.5) -27.2*** (0.4) -8.5*** (0.3) -2.4***	years 17+	2.9	(5.3)	11.5***	(3.7)	2.4	(4.1)	4.9	(4.3)	16.1**	(7.3)	6.3	(4.6)	4.5	(4.5)	3.0	(4.6)
$-27.9^{***}  (0.5)  -25.3^{***}  (0.3)  -9.7^{***}  (0.3)  -3.0^{***}  (0.2)  -35.4^{***}  (0.5)  -27.2^{***}  (0.4)  -8.5^{***}  (0.3)  -2.4^{***}  (0.8)  -2.$	Equal property division	-0.2	(0.7)	0.1	(0.5)	0.5	(0.6)	$1.4^{**}$	(0.7)	-0.1	(0.9)	-0.5	(9.0)	0.0	(0.7)	1.5**	(0.7)
	Child	-27.9***	(0.5)	-25.3***		-9.7**	(0.3)	-3.0***	(0.2)	-35.4***	(0.5)	-27.2***	(0.4)	-8.5**	(0.3)	-2.4***	(0.3)

<sup>a</sup> The estimations presented in this table are equivalent to those presented in Table 5, however, control in addition (with a binary variable) for the presence of own children in the household. Coefficients give the percentage point change in the age-specific probability to be in the labor force rate due to the adoption of the respective law (the stated number of years ago). Robust standard errors (allowing for clustering by state-year and heteroskedasticity of unknown form) in parentheses. \*, \*\* and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively.

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Table A.7: The effect of the adoption of joint custody on domestic violence<sup>a</sup>

	Overall	${f violence}^b$	Sever v	$\mathbf{iolence}^b$
	Husband to wife	Wife to husband	Husband to wife	Wife to husband
	Average	incidence of e	each type of	violence
	11.5%	11.7%	3.2%	4.4%
Estimated change in violence rates in treatm	nent states r	elative to cont	rol states	
OLS (difference-in-differences)	0.3% (1.9)	-0.50% (1.8)	1.7% $(1.2)$	-0.1% (1.1)
Add state fixed-effects	-0.8% (1.7)	-0.40% (1.3)	1.3% $(0.9)$	-0.1% (0.7)
${\rm Add\ individual\ controls}^c$	0.0% (1.8)	0.60% (1.2)	1.7%* (0.9)	$0.4\% \ (0.7)$
${\rm Add\ state-level\ time\ varying\ controls}^d$	-2.7%* (1.5)	0.40% (1.1)	0.5% $(0.8)$	$0.7\% \ (0.9)$
Probit with full-set of $\operatorname{controls}^e$	-2.5%* (1.3)	0.20% (1.1)	$0.0\% \ (0.5)$	0.3% $(0.7)$

<sup>a</sup> This table summarizes regression results which follow Table II in Stevenson and Wolfers (2006). However, instead of the effect of unilateral divorce law on domestic violence, the impact of joint custody laws on domestic violence is analyzed here. (The inclusion of controls for the introduction of unilateral divorce law has little impact.) The original data source is two household surveys called Physical Violence in American Families conducted by Murray Straus and Richard J. Gelles in the years 1976 and 1985 which covered the majority of states, see Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research studies number 7733 and 9211. I exclude observations from states that are not present in the 1976 data, as well as observations from IN (127) and NH (15), since these states adopted joint custody before 1976. The final estimation sample includes 5,666 observations (1976: N = 1,910; 1985: N = 3,756). Each entry reflects a separate regression, where the dependent variable is a binary variable set equal to one if the household reports a violent incident as having occurred between spouses over the preceding year, and zero otherwise. In each case domestic violence in intact marriages from 21 treatments states (CA, CO, CT, FL, ID, KS, LA, MD, ME, MI, MN, MO, MS, MT, NC, NE, NJ, NY, OH, PA, WI adopted joint custody between 1976 and 1984) is compared to domestic violence in intact marriages from 14 control states (AL, AZ, GA, IL, OK, OR, SC, TN, TX, UT, VA, VT, WA, WV adopted joint custody not before 1985). All regressions include year fixed-effects. Reported coefficients reflect the change in the relevant spousal violence rate in treatment relative to control states in percentage points. Robust standard errors (allowing for clustering by 70 state-years and heteroskedasticity of unknown form) are in parentheses. \*, \*\* and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively. <sup>b</sup> Severe violence is defined as kicking, bitting, hitting with fist, hitting or trying to hit with something, beating up a partner, threatening with a gun or a knife, or using a gun or a knife, in the past year. Overall violence also includes throwing something at partner, pushing, grabbing or shoving, and slapping. <sup>c</sup> Individual controls include a saturated set of dummies for respondent's age, race and gender, and the educational attainment and current labor force status of both husband and wife. d State-level time-varying controls include the maximum level of AFDC for a family of four in that state-year, the proportion of the population on welfare, the ratio of female to male employment rates, the state unemployment rate, and log personal income per capita. e These probit estimations include the full-set of control variables mentioned above. Marginal effects are reported.

# A.3 Estimation results of the effect of jc on the incidence of legitimization

To my best knowledge, there is no genuine data on legitimizations available for the US. However, one can obtain a proxy for the incidence of legitimization by re-constructing information on legitimizations from marital and fertility history of female respondents from the Current Population Survey, June 1995: Fertility and Marital History Supplement. However, it should be noted that this procedure is problematic for at least two reasons: (i) There is only information available on the current state of residence (i.e. at the time of the interview), which is not necessarily equal to the state of residence at the time of legitimization. (ii) It is not guaranteed that the groom of the subsequent marriage is actually the child's (biological) father. Ignoring these two potential sources of error, I use micro-level data (from 153, 855 children of 30, 771 mothers) and define a child as legitimized if his/her mother has not been married at the time of birth, however, married subsequently. Based on this definition I construct state-level data (for all state-years from 1969) through 1994) on the number of legitimization per 1,000 adults. Based on a regression analysis (equivalent to the other outcomes presented in the paper) one can see patterns, which support the estimation results of the effect of joint custody on age-specific marriage rates (of older couples). The point estimates (summarized in Figure A.11 and Table A.8) suggest a delayed and growing impact of joint custody on the incidence of legitimization. The standard errors are quite big, and the coefficients are not statistically significant at conventional levels, however, one has to consider the high level of noise which can be expected in this data.




Figure A.11: The effect of the adoption of jc on the incidence of legitimization<sup>a</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> This graph summarizes estimation results presented in Table A.8.

$\epsilon$ of legitimization $^a$
$\ddot{\circ}$
tion of jc on the inciden
dob
t of the a
The effec
Table A.8:

	(I)		(II)	(1		(III)
Static model:						
Joint custody	~6.0-	(5.7)	-0.8%	(6.1)	0.5%	(7.4)
Unilateral divorce	6.4%	(9.5)	4.6%	(6.7)	8.7%	(12.0)
Equal property division	3.7%	(5.1)	1.6%	(6.2)	7.1%	(9.0)
Dynamic model:						
Joint custody in effect for						
year 0	8.2%	(6.9)	9.6%	(7.7)	89.6	(8.6)
years 1-2	2.9%	(6.3)	6.2%	(7.7)	6.5%	(10.1)
years 3-4	-4.6%	(0.9)	0.4%	(8.5)	2.3%	(11.8)
years 5-6	-4.8%	(7.4)	1.7%	(11.5)	80.9	(17.1)
years 7-8	0.7%	(8.6)	9.3%	(15.5)	15.8%	(21.9)
years 9-10	11.0%	(11.2)	22.5%	(22.3)	32.6%	(30.7)
years 11+	12.6%	(10.6)	27.8%	(26.5)	45.3%	(38.2)
Unilateral divorce in effect for						
year 0	2.4%	(8.4)	-2.6%	(8.5)	9.9%	(0.6)
years 1-2	3.9%	(11.9)	-0.5%	(12.0)	17.0%	(16.2)
years 3-4	1.7%	(10.6)	-3.3%	(12.1)	19.9%	(20.2)
years 5-6	17.6%	(13.3)	10.2%	(12.9)	37.7%	(24.6)
years 7-8	14.0%	(13.1)	4.7%	(13.8)	34.9%	(26.4)
years 9-10	26.8%**	(11.3)	15.3%	(19.0)	46.8%	(31.2)
years 11+	4.5%	(10.8)	-10.7%	(22.5)	20.8%	(36.1)
Equal property division	3.5%	(4.9)	1.0%	(5.8)	8.0%	(7.8)
State and year fixed-effects	yes		yes	SS		yes
State-specific linear time trends	ou		yes	S		yes
State-specific quadratic time trends	ou		ou	C		yes

legitimizations per state-year is estimated based on micro-level data from the Current Population Survey, June 1995: Fertility and Marital History Supplement. Estimated using state population weights (equal to the denominator of adults/male adults), and variables capturing the age and race composition. Listed coefficients are reported as the <sup>a</sup> This table summarizes estimation results of the effect of joint custody on the legitimization rate based on annual The legitimization rate is defined as the absolute number of legitimizations per 1,000 adults. The number of the dependent variable). Each specification (in each model) includes the variables listed, state and year fixed-effects, the minimum legal ages at marriage, legalized abortion, the gross state product per capita, the adult sex ratio (female percent change in the legitimization rate due to the adoption of the respective law (the stated number of years ago). Robust standard errors (allowing for clustering by state and heteroskedasticity of unknown form) in parentheses. \*\* indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. Figure A.11 provides a graphical summary of these results. US state-level data (excluding Nevada) from 1969 through 1994. The number of observations is equal to 1,274.

# A.4 Estimation results of the effect of joint custody on the stock of married population

The analysis in the paper provides convincing evidence that the introduction of joint custody has increased marriage rates, and I observe some positive effects on divorce rates (especially for older couples). Apart from the analysis of these two *flow* measures it is instructive to analyze the impact on the *stock* of *currently* married population. This analysis should give the net effect of the two flow measures.<sup>2</sup> It should be emphasized that the impact of any intervention does not necessarily have the same sign on the flow and the stock measurements. For instance, an intervention may create additional marriages. However, if these additional marriages are very instable, and/or the policy increases the divorce likelihood of existing (and/or subsequent 'always-taking') marriages, the stock of married people may even decrease.

Based on micro-level data from the March CPS King et al.  $(2010)^3$  I estimate the probability that an individual of sex g and in age-group j is currently married, where j is equal to 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, and 45-54. As in the case of the flow measures I use data from the years 1969 through 2003 and consider all states (except Nevada). However, 272 state-years are missing, since 31 states are grouped together between 1969 and 1972, and 37 states are grouped together between 1973 and 1976.<sup>4</sup> A further problem is that I can only capture an individuals current state of residence – which may not be the state of marriage or divorce. In the best case (marriage or divorce induced) migration introduces only additional noise. However, in principal systematic migration between adopting and non-adopting states cannot be rule out.

As method of estimation I use a linear model with frequency weights, where I include the same set of covariates as in specification III of equation (1) in the paper. However, instead of controlling for the race-age distribution, I include race and age dummies on an individual level. In order to capture the full effects of the reform, I do not include any individual controls that might be affected by the reform (such as children). The results are summarized in Table A.9 and in Figure A.12. As expected, we observe for the majority of the sub-groups that joint custody had a positive effect on the stock of currently married population.<sup>5</sup> The effect is strongest in size and statistical significance for individuals between 25 and 34 years of age. For this group we saw comparably smaller effects on marriage rates, however, also almost no effect on divorce rates. That means, the observed patterns in the flow and the stock analysis are quite consistent. For instance, the estimation suggests an increase in the likelihood of being married for males in this age-group by about 1.4 percentage points starting three 3 to 4 years after the reform. Over the following years, this effect grows to almost 6 percentage points. The effects for individuals

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Alternatively, one could study the impact on the stock of ever married (divorced) population. No adequate data source to measure the stock of ever divorced population is available. The CPS stopped collecting information on previous marriages after 1971; and the US Census after 1980.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>King, Miriam, Steven Ruggles, Trent Alexander, Sarah Flood, Katie Genadek, Matthew B. Schroeder, Brandon Trampe and Rebecca Vick (2010), 'Integrated public use microdata series, current population survey: Version 3.0. [machine-readable database]', University of Minnesota.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>In particular, the following states are missing for the period in brackets: AK, AL, AR, AZ, CO, DE, HI, IA, ID, KS, ME, MI, MN, MS, MT, ND, NE, NH, NM, OK, RI, SC, SD, UT, VA, VT, WA, WI, WY (from 1969 through 1976); MA, NC (from 1969 through 1972); and GA, KY, LA, MD, MO, OR, TN, WV (from 1973 through 1976).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>The only – somewhat puzzling – exception are men and women between 20 and 24 years of age. A possible explanation for this result is that for this age-group, the state of residence is a bad proxy for the state of marriage and divorce.

between above 35 years of age are almost all positive, however, relatively small and statistically insignificant. In the case of individuals between 35 and 44 years of age, this result is in line with the analysis of the flow measurements. We observed comparably large effects on marriage rates, but also on divorce rates. For individuals between 45 and 54 years of age, given the analysis from above, we would actually have expected a more pronounced positive effect on the stock of currently married population.


Table A.9: The effect of the adoption of joint custody on the stock of married population (percentage point change)<sup>a</sup>

				Females	les							Ma	Males			
	20	20 to 24	25 to	34	35 t	to 44	45 to	54	20 to	24	25 to	34	35 to	44	45 to	o 54
Static model:																
Joint custody	-0.3	(0.6)	0.2	(0.4)	0.3	(0.5)	0.1	(0.5)	-0.4	(0.6)	-0.3	(0.5)	0.9**	(0.5)	-0.0	(0.4)
Unilateral divorce	1.1	(1.3)	1.9**	(0.9)	0.7	(0.9)	0.0	(0.9)	-2.1	(1.4)	9.0-	(1.0)	-0.6	(1.0)	-2.0** -0.6	(0.8)
Dynamic model.				(0:0)	5	(0:0)		(0:0)				(0:0)		0:0		(0:0)
Dynamic model:																
Joint custody in effect for																
years 0	8.0	(0.8)	9.0	(0.0)	0.5	(0.0)	-0.8	(9.0)	-0.1	(0.7)	-0.1	(0.7)	0.3	(0.7)	9.0-	(0.0)
years 1-2	9.0-	(0.8)	9.0	(0.6)	0.1	(0.0)	9.0	(9.0)	-1.2	(0.8)	0.2	(0.7)	0.7	(9.0)	-0.1	(0.0)
years 3-4	-1.5	(1.1)	1.2	(0.8)	0.2	(0.8)	1.1	(8.0)	-2.0**	(1.0)	1.4*	(0.8)	1.3	(0.8)	0.5	(0.8)
years 5-6	-0.8	(1.4)	1.7*	(1.0)	8.0	(1.0)	0.1	(1.0)	-0.9	(1.3)	1.6	(1.0)	1.5	(1.0)	-1.2	(1.0)
years 7-8	-0.3	(1.8)	1.7	(1.2)	6.0	(1.3)	8.0	(1.2)	-1.5	(1.6)	2.2*	(1.3)	0.7	(1.2)	-0.2	(1.2)
years 9-10	0.3	(2.1)	2.0	(1.4)	0.5	(1.5)	-0.8	(1.5)	-1.4	(1.9)	2.5	(1.6)	0.5	(1.4)	6.0	(1.4)
years 11-12	-0.4	(2.4)	2.7	(1.7)	0.1	(1.7)	0.0	(1.7)	-2.9	(2.2)	3.1*	(1.8)	8.0	(1.6)	2.0-	(1.6)
years 13-14	-1.8	(2.7)	2.5	(1.9)	0.2	(2.0)	0.7	(1.9)	-3.8	(2.4)	4.1**	(2.0)	9.0	(1.8)	-1.5	(1.8)
years 15-16	-0.3	(3.0)	2.8	(2.2)	6.0	(2.1)	1.7	(2.1)	-4.4	(2.7)	4.7**	(2.2)	1.2	(2.0)	8.0-	(2.0)
years $17+$	1.0	(3.4)	2.9	(2.6)	6.0	(2.4)	8.0	(2.3)	-4.6	(3.0)	5.6**	(2.5)	9.0	(2.2)	-2.7	(2.3)
Unilateral divorce in effect for	for															
years 0	-0.7	(1.6)	0.1	(1.0)	1.8	(1.1)	-0.5	(0.0)	-1.7	(1.7)	-0.1	(1.1)	-1.8	(1.1)	-0.9	(0.8)
years 1-2	1.2	$\overline{}$	1.2	(1.2)	-1.0	(1.2)	-0.5	(1.4)	-1.6	(1.7)	9.0-	(1.4)	-2.0	(1.2)	-2.8**	(1.2)
years 3-4	3.9*	(2.2)	-1.8	(1.6)	-2.7*	(1.5)	-1.0	(1.7)	-1.4	(2.2)	-2.0	(1.7)	-2.7*	(1.6)	-3.1**	(1.4)
years 5-6	2.0	(2.5)	-2.3	(2.0)	-2.6	(1.8)	-1.4	(2.1)	-1.1	(2.7)	-3.8*	(2.1)	-5.2**	(2.0)	-2.8	(1.8)
years 7-8	1.3	(3.0)	-3.2	(2.3)	-2.7	(2.1)	9.0-	(2.5)	-1.3	(3.1)	-2.9	(2.5)	-5.0**	(2.4)	-2.1	(2.2)
years 9-10	1.1	(3.5)	-4.5*	(2.7)	-3.4	(2.4)	-0.8	(2.8)	-1.8	(3.5)	-3.0	(2.9)	-5.8*	(2.7)	-1.0	(2.5)
years 11-12	1.3	(4.0)	-5.1*	(2.9)	-4.8*	(2.8)	-1.3	(3.1)	-1.1	(3.9)	-3.6	(3.2)	-6.5**	(3.1)	-2.3	(2.8)
years 13-14	2.1	(4.3)	-5.8*	(3.2)	-4.1	(3.0)	-2.5	(3.4)	0.1	(4.1)	-3.1	(3.4)	-7.0**	(3.3)	-2.5	(3.1)
years 15-16	1.5	(4.5)	-6.5*	(3.5)	-5.2	(3.2)	-3.0	(3.6)	-0.1	(4.5)	-3.2	(3.6)	-7.0*	(3.6)	-2.7	(3.3)
years $17+$	1.2	(5.0)	-6.2*	(3.7)	-4.8	(3.4)	-2.5	(3.9)	9.0	(4.7)	-2.9	(3.9)	-8.9**	(3.9)	-2.0	(3.5)
Equal property division	-0.1	(0.8)	-0.1	(0.5)	-0.4	(0.5)	8.0	(0.5)	-0.2	(0.7)	9.0	(9.0)	-0.3	(0.5)	8.0-	(0.5)


an individual level a saturated set of binary variables for individual's race and age is included. Coefficients give the percentage point change in the age-specific probability to be married due to the adoption of the respective law (the stated number of years ago). Robust standard errors (allowing for clustering by state-year and heteroskedasticity of unknown form) in parentheses. \*, \*\* and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at the 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, respectively. Further data from the CPS (excluding Nevada) from 1969 through 2003. Observations from 272 state-years are missing, since several states are grouped together in early years. The dependent variables is in each case equal to one if the individual is married, and zero otherwise. Estimated using a linear probability model with sample weights. Each estimation includes as state-level control variables, the same set of control variables as the specification III of the dynamic model in Table 3. On <sup>a</sup> This table summarizes estimation results of the effect of joint custody on the probability of (females) males in a specific age-group to be married based on micro-level details on all variables are provided in Section A.1.

Figure A.12: The effect of the adoption of joint custody on the stock of married population  $^a$ 





Estimated effect on the probability of being married for men



---- 25 to 34 years

----- 45 to 54 years

20 to 24 years


35 to 44 years

 $<sup>^{</sup>a}$  These graphs summarize estimation results presented in Table A.9.

## A.5 Estimation results for an alternative definition of joint custody


With respect to the allocation of joint custody awards, one can distinguish statues which require parental agreement from those that do not. That means, in the first case, the consent of both parents is required in order to obtain a joint custody award. In the second case, judges have discretion to rule in favor of joint custody even without parents mutual consent, if it conforms to the best interests of the child. Most of the states do not require a parental agreement. Only 6 states required at some point in time parental agreement: Colorado until 1987, Nebraska since 1983, North Carolina until 1987, Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Figures A.13 to A.16 summarize the main estimation results for the alternative definition of joint custody, which only comprises those 857 state-years where no parental agreement has been required. Full estimation output is available upon request.

Figure A.13: The effect of the adoption of joint custody on marriage and divorce rates – alternative definition of  $jc^a$ 




 $<sup>^{</sup>a}$  These graphs summarize estimation results equivalent to those presented in Figure 2, however, using an alternative definition of joint custody.

Figure A.14: The effect of the adoption of jc on group-specific marriage rates – alternative definition of  $jc^a$ 




 $<sup>^</sup>a$  These graphs summarize estimation results equivalent to those presented in Figure 3, however, using an alternative definition of joint custody.


Figure A.15: The effect of the adoption of jc on age-specific fertility behavior – alternative definition of  $\mathrm{jc}^a$ 



<sup>a</sup> These graphs summarize estimation results equivalent to those presented in Figure A.8, however, using an alternative definition of joint custody.

Figure A.16: The effect of the adoption of jc on suicide rates with leads – alternative definition of  $jc^a$ 





— Spec. II (linear trends) — — Spec. III (quadratic trends) — — Spec. III + leads

 $<sup>^</sup>a$  These graphs summarize estimation results equivalent to those presented in Figure 6, however, using an alternative definition of joint custody.